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CASE NOTES
Payment Bonds—Capehart Act—Miller Act—Jurisdictional Require-
ments.—Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Terminal Constr.
Cor25. 1
—One of the defendants, a general contractor, entered into a con-
tract with the United States Navy Department to build military housing. A
payment bond, securing payment to suppliers of labor and material, was
obtained from the defendant, the American Surety Company. This bond
specifically provided for suit in either a state court or a United States district
court. The present action was originally brought in the New Jersey Superior
Court to recover the value of the materials and labor that plaintiff-material-
man furnished defendant's subcontractor. The defendants contended that the
New Jersey courts lacked jurisdiction because the Miller Act, 2 which limits
suits to a United States district court, applied. At the trial level defendants'
motion to dismiss was granted. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed
and held it was the probable intention of Congress in enacting the Capehart
Act' to allow bonds furnished by military housing contractors which did not
conform with the requirements of the Miller Act, provided the form thereof
was satisfactory to the Secretary of Defense, or his designee.
There would be no question of jurisdiction in this case if the Miller
Act alone controlled since it clearly provides for exclusive jurisdiction in the
United States district courts. The problem exists, however, because the project
in question was military housing construction and thus subject to the pro-
visions of the Capehart Act. As a result of these two statutes the court in
the principal case was faced with the question of whether the bond require-
ments of the Miller Act control military housing built under the Capehart
Act. At this point it is believed that a brief discussion of these two statutes
is necessary in order to adequately perceive the difficulty with which the
court was faced.
To divine Congress' intent in enacting the Capehart Act, it is important
to consider the legislation preceding this Act. The first such piece of legis-
lation reaches back to the Act of August 13, 1894, 4 commonly known as the
Heard Act, which was amended in 1905.
The Miller Act was passed on August 24, 1935.
[T]he act is remedial in character, therefore, it should be liberally
interpreted. The purpose of the Act is to protect those who furnish
labor or materials, or both, for public building and works and to
insure payment in full for such materials and labor in addition to
the object of securing faithful performance for the government. 5 .
1 41 N.J. 500, 197 A.2d 557 (1964).
2 Section 1, 49 Stat. 793, 794, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a, 270b (1935). The Miller Act sets
out what type of bonds are required of building contractors who are engaged in public
construction. The substantive and procedural aspects of the required bonds are clearly set
forth in the Act.
3 69 Stat. 651, 42 U.S.C. § 1594 (1955). The Capehart Housing Act was designed
to provide necessary housing for military personnel in order to attract a higher caliber of
man to the armed services. The construction of the houses was completely under the
auspices of the United States Government, but it was to be financed with private money.
4 28 Stat. 278 (1894).
5 Stickells, Bonds of Contractors on Federal Public Works, 36 B.U.L.Rev. 499,
508-09 (1956).
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Under this act provision was made for two separate bonds, one for per-
formance and one for payment. Suit could be instituted before completion
of a project and there was no requirement of one suit only on a bond. The
act clearly set out the exclusive forum for litigation to be the United States
district court for any district in which the contract was to be performed and
executed. Reports° from the House Committee on the Judiciary set out the
purpose of the Miller Act, tying it into the problems created by the Heard Act.
In 1955, the Capehart Housing Act was passed. It was concerned with
military housing and the great need for this type of housing in order to
attract a higher caliber of man to the Armed Services. Under this act private
financing was to be used for the construction of the houses. Until the
Capehart Act was amended, there seemed to be no question that the Miller
Act did control, but the court in the principal case had to interpret the
1956 Amendment7
 which provided:
Any such contract shall provide for the furnishing by the contractor
of a performance bond and a payment bond with a surety or sureties
satisfactory to, the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, and the
furnishing of such bonds shall be deemed a sufficient compliance
with the provisions of section 270a of Title 40 [the Miller Act],
and no additional bonds shall be required under such section.
In reaching its decision the court examined its previous decision in
Gypsum Contractors, Inc. v. American Sur. Co. 8 and then proceeded to
discuss and rely on two recent federal cases, United States v. Harrison &
Grimshaw Constr. Co.,9
 and Continental Cas. Co. v. United States." To
further buttress its point of view, the court relied on a letter" written by
the Assistant Secretary of Defense to the House Committee on Banking and
Currency proposing the 1956 Amendment,
The facts in the Gypsum case may be distinguished from those in the
▪ 79 Cong. Rec. 11702, 13382; H.R. Rep. No. 1263, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ;
S. Rep. No. 1238, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). The Miller Act was designed to meet the
problems created by the Heard Act. Two bonds were required instead of the one
required under the Heard Act. Thus the government was protected by a performance
bond, and creditors could now sue without waiting for the government to put in its
claims or for the project to be completed since they were protected by the payment
bond.
7. Capehart Housing Act §§ 506(b)-(d), 507, 70 Stat. 1110, 42
	
§ 1594(a)
(1956).
8
 37 N.J. 315, 181 A.2d 174 (1962).
O 305 F.2d 363 (10th Cir. 1962).
to 305 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1962).
11
 Hearings on H.R. 10157 Before House Committee on Banking & Currency, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 195-96 (1956).
'	 It is also recommended that H.R. 10157 be amended to make it clear that the
provisions of the Miller Act (40 U.S.C. 270a) are not applicable to Title VIII
housing. It appears more appropriate to provide for use of F.H.A. dual obligee
bond form for both performance and payment bonds. The cost of the F.H.A.
bond is substantially less than the cost of bonds required by the Miller Act
for public works, so that the proposed amendment will serve to decrease the
cost of construction and otherwise facilitate contractual relationships.
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principal case. In Gypsum, suit was brought on the bond by an unpaid
subcontractor in a New Jersey state court, although the project was situated
in Syracuse, New York. The bond specifically permitted suit in either a
state court or a United States district. court, but the suit had to be brought
in the district where the project was located. Notwithstanding the applica-
bility of the Miller Act, it is clear the suit could not be brought in New
Jersey since the project was in New York. The Gypsum court, however, in
reaching its decision, held that the Miller Act controlled on the basis of
previous decisions in federal circuit courts, and on an interpretation of the
1956 Amendment as set forth in United States v. Fort George G. Meade. 12
In the principal case, however, the same court just two years later deter-
mined that two subsequent decisions in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits which
held contrary to Gypsum on the applicability of the Miller Act to Capehart
Act construction must be given weight in reaching its decision.
The Tenth Circuit in Harrison and Grimshawla held that military
housing under the Capehart Act was private enterprise, and therefore the
Miller Act was not applicable. It reached this decision through an analysis
of the financial structure that underlies Capehart construction. Instead of
using public funds, an arrangement has been authorized by the Capehart Act
that permits the use of private money in the construction of Capehart
projects. There was a dissent by Judge Pickett who pointed out that the
. reason for the financial arrangement was that funds were not currently avail-
able and the plan allowed the United States to build necessary military
housing on the installment plan. While the court in the principal case is not
in agreement with the premise that Capehart housing is private enterprise,
it does agree that Congress intended to confer on the Secretary of Defense, or
his designee, discretion as to the type of bond to be required for a Cape-
hart project.
The Eighth Circuit in Continental Cas. Co. 14 rejected the concept of
private enterprise but held that the Miller Act does not control Capehart
housing, stating:
. . . Congress intended that the procedural provisions of Capehart
bonds should be worked out and prescribed by the two agencies
[Department of Defense and Federal Housing Administration]
involved in light of the unique nature of Capehart construction... . 15
The court decided that the language of the 1956 Amendment clearly took
Capehart bonds out of the Miller Act because if Congress had intended the
procedural provisions of the Miller Act to apply to Capehart bonds, it
simply would have said so.
12
 186 F. Supp. 639, 648 (D. Md. 1960).
As a Capehart Act bond constitutes "compliance" with section 270a of Title 40
and section 2706 of said title authorizes suit by materialmen on a payment
bond furnished under section 270a, this court can conclude only that section
270b, read in conjunction with section 1594(a) of Title 42, confers jurisdic-
tion upon this court. Ibid.
18 Supra note 9.
14 Supra note 10.
16 Continental Cas. Co. v. United States, supra note 10, at 799.
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The court in the principal case, after discussing Gypsum and the above
two cases, stated its concern for the plaintiff's position since the limitation
period for bringing suit under both the Miller Act and the Capehart bond had
expired. If the suit were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff
could not bring suit in the United States district court. With this consider-
ation in mind, and aware, also, of the remedial nature of both the Miller
and Capehart Acts whose purpose is to aid materialmen, the court decided
that the two federal cases cast doubt on its holding in Gypsum. The court
because of this doubt felt:
Where a conflict exists among them, [the federal courts] with no
final word from the United States Supreme Court, and each of
the two conflicting interpretations can find reasonable support in the
wording of the statute, thus leaving a choice to the state courts, the
path chosen should be that which leads to the more just result under
the circumstances of the particular case in light of the basic remedial
purposes of the legislation.' 6
Reference was then made to the letter" from the Assistant Secretary of
Defense to the House Committee on Banking and Currency which proposed
the 1956 Amendment. The letter's language in reference to the nonapplica-
bility of Section 270a of the Miller Act and the statement that the F.H.A.
bond which permits suit in state or federal courts was to be used, seemed
to give force to the point of view held in the Eighth and Tenth Circuit courts.
The court on the basis of the foregoing held that the New Jersey state court
had jurisdiction of the suit on the bond in question.
It is suggested that the court erred in allowing the New Jersey courts
to retain jurisdiction. The hearings 10 before the House Committee on Banking
and Currency set forth in plain terms the reasons why private financing was
adjudged the best method for construction of military housing. It was entirely
a matter of budgetary considerations involving the desire to hold down the
Government's cash outlay for the fiscal year. At no point was there any inti-
mation that Capehart housing was to be considered as anything but public
building. To call it private enterprise because of its financial structure would
be to completely misinterpret Congress' intention. Congress was faced with a
need for military housing and a desire to hold down Government expenditure.
18 Supra note 1, at 514, 197 A.2d at 565.
17 Hearings on H.R. 10157, supra note 11, at 195-96.
18 Hearings on H.R. 10157 . I3efore House Committee on Banking & Currency, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1956).
The following is an excerpt of a report to the House Committee by Mr. John Arring-
ton of the Family Housing Division, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prop-
erties and Installations.
To meet this substantial and urgent requirement, we in the Department of
Defense believe . . . the best and cheapest method involves construction of
public quarters through use of funds directly appropriated for that purpose.
However, despite the advantages of the appropriated fund method, it has
one inherent limitation—budgetary considerations will not permit expenditure
in one or two fiscal years of the sums needed to meet the total need. . . . This
legislation provided a sound means to do the job quickly, utilizing private
capital to be repaid out of quarters allowances over a twenty-five year period.
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As a result, a plan was devised whereby the necessary housing could be
privately financed, but the housing was at all times considered public work,
which was defined by Mr. Justice Holmes in Title Guar. & Trust Co. v..
Crane," ". . if it belongs to the representative of the public, it is public... ."
A further definition of public works can be found in United States v. Irwin2°
where it was stated:
. . . Congress, in the N.I.R.A., specifically defined "public works"
as including "any projects of the character heretofore constructed
or carried on either directly by public authority or with public aid
to serve the interest of the general public."
It can not possibly be held in light of the foregoing that Capehart housing is
anything but public construction.
Concerning the Amendment to the Capehart Act that was passed in
1956, on May 24, 1956, Senator Sparkman, as Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Housing, presented a section by section analysis of the pending bill stating:
(f) Amends section 403(a) of Housing Amendments of 1955 to
clarify the bonding requirements imposed upon contractors who
build under this act.21
Then on June 4, 1956, the letter22 referred to earlier in this note was written.
It is submitted that when reference is made to the strong emphasis placed
on the financial structure of Capehart housing, the real significance of the
letter lies in the statement:
The cost of the F.H.A. bond is substantially less than the cost of
bonds required by the Miller Act for public works . . . the proposed
amendment will serve to decrease the cost of contruction. . . .23
It is clearly stated in the Amendment' that only Section' 270a of the Miller
Act is being superseded, and it is superseded by a bond "with surety or
sureties satisfactory to the Secretary of Defense, or his designee."'" How
can it be assumed the phrase "surety or sureties satisfactory" confers on
the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, the power to alter the jurisdictional
requirements of Section 270b of the Miller Act? In United States v. Travelers
Indem. Co.,25 the court determined that the Amendment simply and logically
identified the Secretary of Defense or his designee as the only contracting
officer authorized to award military housing contracts "with surety or sureties
satisfactory" to him on the bond. The reference to the Miller Act in the
Amendment showed Congress' clear conviction that the Miller Act applied
to all contracts authorized under the 1955 Capehart Act. On its face, the
language assumes Miller bonds are legally required for Government contracts
19 219 U.S. 24, 33 (1910).
20 316 U.S. 23, 29 (1942).
21 102 Cong. Rec. 8874 (1956) (remarks of Senator Sparkman).
22 See, Hearings on H.R. 10157, supra note 11.
23 Ibid.
24 Capehart Housing Act §§ 506(b)-(d), 507, 70 Stat. 1110, 42 U.S.C. § 1594a
(1956).
25 215 F. Supp. 455 (D. Mo. 1963).
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entered into under the 1955 Capehart Act. The Amendment merely authorizes
a bond that will comply with Section 270a of the Miller Act and then simply
cuts down the power of the contracting officer when it states "no additional
bonds shall be required under such section." The Miller Act under Section
270a(c) specifically authorizes the contracting officer to require additional
bonds.
The court in the principal case discussed Travis Equip. Co. v. D&L
Constr. Co.,26 the most recent federal decision dealing with control of Cape-
hart bonds by the Miller Act. However, it dismissed the applicability of
Travis to the issue presently confronting it, because the problem in Travis
was the suit limitation period set out in a Capehart bond and in the Miller
Act. The suit in Travis had been brought within the time period specified
in the Capehart bond, but the time allowed to bring suit under the Miller
Act had expired. The court held that the bond was required by the Miller Act
which controlled the jurisdictional and substantive law of such bonds. The
court in the principal case neglected the fact that both the suit limitation
period and the requirement of suit in a United States district court appear
in the same section of the Miller Act, that is, in section 270b. How can
one part of section 270b be held to control Capehart bonds and another
part of the same section be held not controlling? In Travis the court stated:
Congress has not by any legislation, including but not limited to
the provisions of the Capehart Act, authorized the Secretary of
Defense to vest any State Court with jurisdiction over the causes
of action here involved. . . . [W]e believe Congress intended that
its long established policy of exclusive federal jurisdiction was to
continue and that the vagaries of undeveloped state law were to
be thereby avoided.27
The Miller Act specifically stated that the forum for litigation was to be a
United States district court. There was never any question that the Miller
Act covered Capehart Act bonds until the 1956 Amendment to the Capehart
Act. Where in the Amendment has the Secretary of Defense been authorized
to vest any state court with jurisdiction over the causes of action here in-
volved? The courts, with Capehart construction, are still dealing with public
work in which the United States Government has the primary interest
regardless of how the housing is financed. Can it be said that Congress in
its one sentence Amendment to the Capehart Act intended to allow state
courts to invade a domain that has been in the exclusive control of the
federal courts? To read such a meaning into the Amendment would necessi-
tate the belief that Congress intended to change its whole policy in regard
to public construction bonds. If this were Congress' intent, it would have
been stated with far more clarity. If the court in the principal case feels truly
bound to give weight to recent federal decisions, it cannot summarily dis-
regard the above case which is cleirly in point with the issue facing it.
In summary, it appears evident the court was moved by equitable
considerations and sought to substantiate its decision in a legal context by
26 224 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mo. 1963).
27 Travis Equip. Co. v. D & L Constr. Co., supra note 26, at 417-18.
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relying on Grimshaw28 and the Continental Casualty" cases coupled with
an interpretation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense's June 4, 1956 letter
to overrule its holding in Gypsum. 8° In attempting to justify its result the
court stated it was the
probable intention of Congress to permit furnishing of bonds by
military housing contractors which did not conform with the re-
quirements of the Miller Act, so long as the form thereof was satis-
factory to the Secretary of Defense or his designee,"
The court thus has dismissed the important conclusions reached in the most
recent federal case, Travis, and overlooked the relevant portions in the Hear-
ings before the House Banking and Currency Committee that shed light on
Congress' intent in enacting the Capehart Act and its Amendment.
HELEN SLOTNICK
Sales—Liability of Cigarette Manufacturer Under Implied Warranty.—
Ross it. Philip Morris & Co.1---Plaintiff, a resident of Missouri, and a con-
firmed smoker since 1934, smoked several packages daily of Philip Morris
cigarettes from 1934 until 1952. In 1952, plaintiff discovered that he had
throat cancer. As a result of an operation for the cancer, plaintiff had to
breathe through an opening in his neck and speak with the aid of an electrical
device attached to his throat. Plaintiff sued defendant cigarette manu-
facturer, inter alia, for breach of implied warranty. Judgment was entered for
the cigarette manufacturer, and plaintiff appealed. In affirming the decision of
the district court, the Circuit Court of Appeals HELD: Under Missouri law,
a manufacturer's implied warranty means that the product is reasonably
fit for its intended use and, under proper circumstances, the manufacturer is
an insurer against recognizable dangers, but such implied warranty does not
extend to harmful effects which no developed human skills or developed
scientific knowledge could have anticipated during the period of plaintiff's
use of the product.
The controversy concerning the connection between cigarette smoking
and cancer was emphasized with the Report of the Advisory Committee to
the Surgeon General of the United States.2 This Report, after discussing the
many aspects of public health and smoking, concluded that smoking and can-
cer are causally related .2 By connecting smoking and cancer, this Report will
likely promote actions against cigarette manufacturers based on implied
28 Supra note 9.
22 Supra note 10.
33 Supra note 8.
81 Supra note 1, at 516, 197 A.2d at 566.
1 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
2 Smoking and Health, Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of
the Public Health Service, Public Health Publication No. 1103 (1964).
3 Id. at 37.
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